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in response to qhaoaea i n th» *tr.uetwe of production and groups con-r.
trolling-the .state. In ttoeneAsltf ]Jb*a& o<l industrialisation in South.'
Afria« (circa ^690-lft30b^bBj«rta»etion^f -*urpluo value rested ca •.-.•:
the «rtioulatioa be,VweB-Vfowo>lesiof proOuifttioii, i . e . b«twwo* . : •
dcoiiwwt.capitalist wo*e anA:«. subordinate precapitalist mod*, within
an overall economic sy^t*». , I» <tbjt.aytbologj!:O£ 6outh African capital-
ism, {peaaant production in ^bt. African Reserre* 'and. .trtw netvarit of
Kinship relations vttjtiq thoir r*4i»triWtivfl «conoini«s ver9 do«m«d to
prqTid* botb subfis^en^i and u»J»fajre XOaction tor thetfeniliM of
ndgrant VQiA^f, ^btta fu?qi«h£ng t te H^Ok of t*le;iiec««aary product tor.
the tr¥p^uctioq.o.fr^bourt?«9»»' Pro«d froo tb©fO$e4:tQ iproride for
the reproduction pf labour. j>oyer in the fora.of va^ea, enployora couli
thua ,Ti* vagesat -the eu s^i«*eau?© l»v«l of tba iadiyidual worlter, there-
by ifacilitating a high i^TCi;CJ ewrpJy* vnluo appropriation. This
ay stem of cheap labourwas BpanjseA a n t h f r workers' aeceesr to ;%be jsejuu
of production .(^ Land) in tbeiBeoeirvee.. Thus primitive accumulation in
South;Africa,i3ep«cd«4 not OQ the, eeparattion of labcrtt from ^he-0O«u of
production :A«nYiafli%-vith-jio otbt* means ..afl outjaiafcence than the sal«
of labour jpou»ff:(as in, £urcnwl, but rather oo the maintenance aod ,
tranaforaation of pr^Cigpitaliet relations of production in the Rowrwe,
so producinK aparticulftr Tom of Ttfclfltarionisfttioq. By historical
accident producer* in the pr«c»pi1sftHrtj!»od«. were, black. U»y were
exploited and oppressed not b.«cauee. of, .their, -pigmentation, "tart because
the Burplua v«ltt« created, b/'their labour vnft re<»{lre4.fOP aecMOUla-
tion invthe. c#©i*ftJiB* modern -.Tbie major i.sociaa contssdiction 4ay thu«
not betvoen^MndiffeteMi**** vlriiiteian4;bl«ck-3»OBWlati0n8, but between
labour in.the. precapitalist jaode «td :<iayit&l!_io..-tbe .capitalist mode.
However,this relation*iup.betnfe«3 4^ he mdooa.nproduced. conditjLonB whiab
gradually ^ggo^veA^l^. pJW«?i,t«li.st relatioB* ot production in the
R98erve*tillfladi1Qg,1totltfce:04«^lqpn»nt of-a, sioflle Oap/iftolist mode «f
production* 1Jhe. basis g^eogdpitation thu» shifted fa^ oa -the relation-
ship between t«o modeapfj^pTpdwrtipntt.Oione..-within tbo capitalist node
itself» aQd t^h* maj^ contradiction shifted, to that between labour.and
capital within the single node of ,prpdi*&ti<ftn, ... . ... . ••
Jq resppof^rto ;both-thft aeed^or ca^Ji inccaae (for taxes e tc . ) and
the growth pf new iaarketB for pyoduQet particalarly that created by-
the burgeoning aining industry after 1&79. during the 19th Century
tribal African subsistence producers were transformed into a surplus
producing,peasantry within the colonial state. ,.?n many cases this
peasantry out-producedvvhit* fawje-yd, veeffipeting .sucpesQfully
1. This i s an oversimplifi-eiJ outline of a theoretical1 fornrulation in •
H, Wolpe, *Canitaliscu tad Cfleap, 'iJqboiir^Power-in 3outH Africa: Tton
•Segregation to Apartheid', Econccy-^ aad Soci<rty. I . -I9t2^- •
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and-a small group of nall-Bdal* African eepitaliat. farmers emerged
to'coopriee a nascent rural ffoux^eHeie. Given the relatively un-
restricted peasant access to'laaOva^ic^tural1 promotion thus pro-
vided the peasantry with axr«tvrt&dtire-ana' lucrative source of cash
income. Tbe Blow operation of msrket force*'could not provide
requisite supply of labour for &Xbdr thd mines'^ or white fanis1;"
the ta&ch±oery <of tfh* *tcte bad t o M'^aed t o propel labour into tbeee
sector*;: Tb» last decade at %*a-J9ta and ttae' firrft of the 20th *eri-
turies eav a gathering legislative artault on tbe independence of the1
peasantry, caOmiaatine ih the Land Act of 1913 C"fjfr»ifieantly pas*tfd
after tbe unification of the four province*), tfhfe 'Act delaintea the
African Reoerves for the first time* restricting them to eooe 13* of
tottfl land aroa; prohibited Afrioon land jtarc have out Bide these areas
and limited.tbe size of individual'ftoldings vitbin then. By severely
restricting access to the neaps' eft production the Act had the three-
fold offeut of undermining th* ecosottio base 'and independence of the
^asantry (effectively de»trtying a lucrative source of. inc^ae and
subsistence); controlling the'proving difftfrentiation within the
Reserrci (destroying tae nat>cc»t bourgeoisie); and freeing Africans
in large numbers for labouf on whtte farm* and the mines • ?et'
Act vas not a simple device :0;f.'14g£AlativB. dispoefleflflion. By.
the resGrvea system and (nov revtyicted) individual access to land
whilst eisfulttmeourfly controlling the influx of /fri^anB into urT>aii
areas' tthrougJi legiilation and'tno paaa "sVateia); i t sought ttf provide •
and control a supply of daeap labour ttarougtothe iflaintenance 'of'pre-
capitalist relations of p-oductioB-in-^e Ratforv'&e; Y0t ty effectively
restricting peasant pi'oductictay'i-t'iacreacitfgly prdduced conditions ;
which undermined these relattona.' "By • 1920 tW'onee large peaaajot
surpluses had dried up as -Bite productive' capacity %iid 'Ability of the"- .
Beserves to ^ support the increasing fopttlafiboB decline*. • Iairpovwriflh-
oent "aivi landlesflnesg dccel^ rsrtJed, '^tSVtt^tHAt'tjt mdnotonoue regularity,
Reports and Coitai»sidn» after 1920revested .to the 'creation of desert
iwnditions in the Native areasfi *aliadd 6t 'appalling poverty' arid
raised the spectre of masa' sKdWation. " ••-...
The Thirties and Fo'Fti«tf ;vltne8Bed v©rV- rapid :growth in1 the
South African ecoribmy «nd ^mpoTtairt changes in the structure of produc-
tion.* The almost total^ependinoe on agricuHure aad mineral' exports
1. See Colin Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African
Peasantry'. Afrioam Affair*. XXXI (1973»; 369-68. . ' : •
2. Report of tneTTative• teOTmJe"OoatriOTtBn" 1930-2 (UG 22/1932).
paras 69*73 et paaain.,}. All official .g^pprts ,on. thai. Reserves :stress
these problem*, 'J8or fairly detai^eo evidence„' see Beport of the. -
Vitwatersrand HJBe"fHatiye .Wageji Conoiaajon (UQ 21/191*1*), paraa llU-283
Alao Bundy op. cit.,"3lW-Tv
me tran'ef'or1hed'iato*&''blgb l o ^ l of industrialisation, and the ooo-
tribution of manufacturing to National Income first surpassed agrt-r.
cultui-*'in:i930i'%otit*triripine"ftihirii by I9U5i^ Stimulated first by
the rise 'in'^he'price of'gold1 'resting from the abaadaam*nt of th#
Gold Standard ib/Deceifter-1932- and'^ heW'ljy Vht demands of vartioe.;.;;
production'/ the ebono^'exjfcnuetf1 in^v&'tu#r***di»t*a- pieriodixofc: • . <
grovth, 193T*9 'and 19^ O>6. : initt0(illi<in year*'National: Income- aloprt
trebled from £&$£/§&'to tTtfr.Sm.1- JThe h\siiber: b r manufacturing .-eataJr
lishmente rote' rVcr/iS,^ 'ltf X93S to" &305: ib-1939 and by 19*«5 ;»tood
at 9,999. Tti6"'gx"o»« TalWof their outfit ibc«a»ed by lliO$ In ti».
first period of 'rg*bVth' and by' a^furfber'H*l$ during1 tne.var*. Within
manufaciurine '^"fimdaKerrtai'AeitdrW.' shift ia the eophssis .of;;jtr^due-
tion occurred; the industrial groiip comprising Toetal. productsi.naqhiner
and trasepurt equipceot had1 eetabliohed i tse l f as the largest group
within the manufacturing ioctflr'OTen before the war, i ts contribution
to total nahutactuHng output^riiiing from 17.6^ to 2S.6% \930r^t;\
whilst that bT food', beverfteot Snd tobacco fe l l from 31#-to Bk%r •. •
This was reflected in tno'increasing capital intensity of industry,
the capital to labour*ration rising from' t-Y^*per worker in 19B2 to
E98V'i'n l^ /rVacTfthg- 'Ei . i^W voVker in'191*6. . ..:
The struggle "Betve'en the national and Taatropolrtan .orieiuted
fractiona'of the Bowg^oisie eaoetf slightly in the period. 1933-9.
The crifliB in South 'African" capitalistf in<Jucadf by the-DeprosBion and
the 1932 Goid Standird:t?rf&i"B linftcif iihe AfriUans-spcaldilg .ruraiand
the Engliah-BpeaKing mlnfiig','£ndU(rtriai and eomsercxal fractious of
tbe bourgeoisie. With-tha 'exception of a1 small- group led by. ftr> .
D. F. Malan in" the' ruling-"ftationalist.Pftrtyi-they iaiA. their better
political differences and jo-inW-'t6sether under-the Preniorship, of
Geperal Hertiog 'in' the' tfeHftd' Sofatn" African' Rational Party (U..P,)'
in 193^. In the Tiret i*ix "years of rapid grovtb' an additional 100,000
whites entered friduB^riaY etaployio t^rt,"arid the 'poor white problem1
1 argel'y"Sl"Bappeared by fS^ O7^ '''Tfie'irtiite labour aartstocracy in i t iated
by tbe Hationaliflt7Labo'ur'"lI1tirty 'Pact1 gov&rnn^pt.qf 192^-9 waa, largely
completed and* vtiite~ vorking-~alaA«-opposition ..and. pressure on the (jovern
ment; suEatiitially reii4Ted» ;Jhe.ti»ch feared, threat to Afrikaner
Hfttaonajj.sn^posed by pptJBnt^^l.lclass mobilisation was largely, removed,
freeing a fut\y.<ltetionaii8t' government.to cpnsolidate Afrikaner
1. - Union Stati-stica for Fffty Years (Pretoria 196O)i S-3. Unless
otherwise" noted, the- statistics thro\ighout this paper are drawn.from
this official source. Until 196*1» the South African t.m t Starling.
• • • > • • . - , . . . . . . .
2. Report of ttie Department of Ltfboqr'.i, "19U0 (UO U5A9U1). ,At i t s
height, the poor white prttHl'em-arfecte"fi' acre" than 1/6 of ;the. vnit.e
population.
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capital provided it defeqd^tfce position c-f privilege i t bwS created
for white labour.* . . . • • - . .:. •• . •
But what of the effect of ^hi« growth on tbfl African population?
The'urban .African population trebled 1921-»t6,
 j By 19^6,almost one in
four Africans w r e i n tfc* wb&a areas..;/ A, significant pointer tjo the
permeneirca of urbjuoisatiQXL. yas, th«^ rapidly increasing ratio of African
voaen to men itr-the c i U « , . f r c s H ^ r . l i ^ i n ^ S ^ t p 1:3 in 19*6.
vhilet the national ratio remain*** const^tj. Betve^n 1933 and 1939
'an additional 2l*O,0OQ Afric^s entered, ittluetrial employment. Though
correspondins figurea. fee: trade and conperce are,.,unavailable, i t has
•been estimated, tbjKt if taken iotorajccount
 t the .increase in urban
•Afrioaii eoployBent daring.^Ijis poriQd..sas ia the order of .'IOOJOOO,
•almost doubling the sise of the urban African labour force.3 A striking
feature of- this hugo influx of labour i s the changing ratio of those
employed in mining to manufacturing(..qonstruqt^on and electricity,
rroo 3l€:8T in 1932, .^eaS? in I???- to.328:321 in I9**6.r. Whilst the
migrant percentage; of tho manufacturing. labour force in 19*16 is not
known, i t is videly accepted that, i t vae both small and decreasing.
By this stage a substantial. African, proletariat (in the classic sense
of those 'freed1 fxoa the aflanjB,;of production. MA, forced to se l l their
labour power in order to aubsiftj)j had developed. .But mine labour vas
purely aigrant.. Bow. did •deyfllqpniant. affect ttieAQ, workers?
This can only be answered by a necessarily brief and crude
examination1 of the. effects.,^ development qn the precapitalist rela-
tions of production in the Reseinres on Vhicb the cheap labour syBtem
reated. The crucial dietinction between a peasantry.and proletariat
i s that whilst the forper- pay.jjipply various quantities of labour as
a form of1 rent. .they retain p&a^easipn of $he meana of production.
Here is tbe Bouroe of tte p^eaatry's.relative economic independence.
If this capacity-to-put, the.oeaos of production.into, operation ils
reduced or 'rauoved, the inde^endpnco.ifl. d/e.sttoyed, and peasants are
'forced to -s«ll'their laloup
 tpo«er( inordep ^o subsist even though
they1 may s t i l l l ive {or in the South,African case, be compelled by
1, All contemporary Nationalist publications stress the need to
prevent such mobilisation. Special, prganieatxons were set up to woo
AfriKaner workers into the bosom'of'the vole:, e .g . Pi e BJankeverter a -
beBkermiaRsbond and Die fiasiocale Raad ?an Trusteee. •
2. Rative Laws CccmiBBion of ajquiry.-l^S-S <U0 28/1948), para 18-28,
• • ' • ' . i - ; . .
 t - . . .
3v: D. Hobart Houghton in Vpl.,,H .Qfi the. Oacford HJBtory of South
:
-A>rick (Oxford,-1971),; 3fc, , ; l<l:-}'-'.], . . ; . ' ; • " ' • :'
;U. 'Posaess'ion* i s used.n<^ to connote ownerahip, but the capacity
to pwt(Jthe means of production ^nvo pperati-oh-r - - . •
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the State to live) on -thtf unproductive land. In buob oases i t i t
suggested, rurlnl rwsldenU team pwt of the proletariat i f denied
possession fin the sen* defined) of the meaba of production and are
thus forced t<y veil their labour pover in order itd' subsist.
Tbe a«cLital«g poroduBtiTity and rapid iiopoverd showst of the
Reaerv*areas after the ittplafiwttt&tice fcf the Land Act U»o already
be on ndted, flcrt' only did productive capacity rapidly fa l l , but Tand-
lesencBB bed*** AtfUte:'; The Pagan Cbnmiswioc of 19W identified three
broad classes iw the Rsttfrres: ovners or oecupders of Land; landless
vho ovned no cattlfe; and laadl*0B vtwso cattle vere graced on comon
land, in the Ciak&i Reserve for enable i t found 30* of fazdites yero
landless, aod enter 60% oWMtfd Hv or fever cattle, 29% ovnioe none.
ThiB broad pa'tt«rn beld true for the other ReaeVvee. In stressing
the octue lafldleie probl«D, «d «&rlier report found-that the i vast
majority 6t recruits t o tile idileB -cama froa the landless in the
Reserves, and that for'the 1ml* of such migrant vorkers, 'Beaerve
production ie but a «ytn'. < In the period under review, the African
labour force -em the vines increas«d by 133,000 or 90#. AOmost a l l
of thie largest evar incroaoe in Migrant labour to the mines occurred
1933-9, when cash vage« -re«»iaed virtually constant, even deolining
briefly; and'real "Wages' f i l l ; Vtaea real vages rosa relatively rapidly
from 19*3 to 1950; total African-employment-6h the nines Actually
fel l . The rite in the mnber of migrants seeking to sel l thair
labour-pevef cannot therefore be explained in terms of the increasing
attractiveness of vage labour. F»th«r» vhen subsistence requireeranrt*
and the'fleeaa dettands of the etate can no longer be met through the
consumption and (tele of coasoddties produced in the precapitalist
mode, wage labour changes from a discretionary to a necessary activity
regardless of vhethef'-Teal wages rise* fall or remain constant.
irapoveri shoent of the R»serv«» so videned the gap between productivity
in the capitalist and precapitalist aodes thst oven those with acoesa
to the means of production vert1 gorged to sel l their labour-power in
order to vubsist. This i f drfatoatically illustrated by the fall in
the percentage of Africans classified as peasants in the census returns
1921-51 (%ble I ) .
1. (UtJ 28A9U9) loc, c i t . and (UO 21/I9»i»*) op.'-eit. paraa 125* 212,
217, 220.
2. Ibid., THblo XXXI pg, 20. 8ee al«d VKJ SteenluDip, 'Bantu Wages in
South Africa' 3.A. Journal of BCOOOPJCB. XXX (19$?) 96. The ratio of
South African to 'foMjan* labour-venoiaed virtittLllyconDtant 1933-1*1^
declining only after 19**2.
3- Sec Q< Arrighi, 'XsAtoar-dc^ rpQiiM in Historical Perspective: A
Study of the Pvoletariaoimtida crt the Afrltaan Peasantry in Rhodesia'
Journal of Develotment "-StaUas, VI "(19T0), '197-231*.
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T a b l d 1 ^ • •• :- • - • • : • . . : .-• .- , \
Total African "•• ' ' • ' Ttotal . • . Ob) a» .-».
Census , population. . Classified . . . . percentage
Yenr over age 15 ao Peasants ' of (a)
^ (a)y ' ' .: -• ' fa) : -
' •
:U»(697I6it3 • -.;;•*• 2.i382,277 - • 50
1536 . ^ , 7 2 7 , 8 1 , 5 . . . . . . . . , 2,1*33,028 . 51.
19^6 >i,795,7W* ' 832,7^8 * ' 17
1951- 5 V 2 1 8 > 0 7 M ' .. . •'-•1*7,653 •  8
- . • . • - , - . 1 •: - . .-•• :. : -. , /
• This fa i l i'a par t ia l ly .explained "by a significant reclaBoifiaa-1
t ion . Women played a crucial role in the system of peasant production.
After 19l*6; a l l .African wctaen^ exoept those vbo expl ic i t ly labelled
themselvaa piasqnfts or forsiera\ vere reelass i f icd aa dependants ( i . e .
ocondmically Inactive). 'No longer-vere-they rtigaarded as peasant
producers, but as people dependent for eubsiBtance 'an cash incona fron
the gale of labour-pover— an implicit goTronmental recopmition-.that
the basis af oheap labour had been eroded. Whilst the reclaeaif ieat ion
d^ea pa r t i a l ly account for-the .decline in the Bize of the peasantry
(the riuaticr of African.v0ffl«o!olciB8ifled.raa pcaaants declining from ..-.
1.3m in 1921 to-under 10^000 ia 1951) i t ' only-accounts for the f a l l
betveen 1936 and 19^6 (when the reclaiaif ioation- occurred), but not
19U6-51. 'Similarly the r e d l r i i a in the number of-econonically.Utctive
Africans is'concealed by the•fttoinietrative: withdrawal of over; l million
women'fron'thiBJ category. •' EffectiTelydeprivod of possession of the
means of production,' by 19**6 the peasantry had been- fa i r ly thoroughly
proletarianised. However, the influx control', measure a of the s t a t e
maintained the sale of labour-power i a a migrant form for raaay#
The period of rapid devalcqboent 1933-^6 did hot produce an
. . . 2African bourgeoisie, •• Rathar'a r e l a t i ve ly snai l trading petty
bourgeoisie'emerged iii.-the" ruraliitreas^'iaealing almost exclusively in
the food t rade , t6g«thfer-with *-new potty: bourgeoisie of professional,
aflciinistrntive awd c ler ica l workers. Together these comprised 0.2?
1. Like a l l unnoted s t a t i s t i c s in thia paper, calculated fron Union
Sta t i s t i cs for Fifty. Years (tig, ft-33). The Tise 1921-36 re'flecta s ta te
policy to return unenployad Africans t o the Reserves during the Depres-
sion. • • '•
2. In his An African Bourgeoisie: Baco. CIRBO mid Po3,jt^ fi«i in South
Afries (Now Hnven, 1965)» Leo Kuper erroneouely equates the bourgeoisie
{these who ovn the neans of production and employ labour for prof i t )
with fractions of the petty bourgeoisie {either employers who themselves
provide part of the manual labour, or professional, administrative and
other 'non-productive? Markers - sometimes called 'the middle c l a s s ' ) .
On th i s point see N. Poulantxas, 'on Social Classes ' , Hew Loft Roview.
lb (1973), 37-9. Whilst the African petty bourgeoisie may have been
an aspirant bourGeoisie, their , posit ion vis-A-vis the South African .
bourgeoisie and the : 9ta te differed, traa. the. usual c l i en t e l i e t r e l a t ion-
ship. ' • ^ . • ..-;•• . ; - j p . . . .
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of adult Africans in 1921, 0.9$ in 1926 and 1.2% or a to ta l of 62,2li6
individuals in 19U6. Th*.exploitation off-tte African proletariat
produced ho material benefit for the African petty bourgeoisie, but
vaa in fact the direct cflme of the ir p o l i t i c a l oppression. The labour
pol ic ies of the state which differentiated between ski l led and unskil led
on racial grounds closed off avenues of nob i l i t y to, th i s class and i n
ef fect lumped them together with the proletariat as p o l i t i c a l l y r i g h t -
l o s s and economically exploitable. They too earned leaa than similarly
sk i l l ed whites and formed a peripheral source of--surplus ralue extrac-
t i o n . • • . •• . • • -; - , • .
Thus by I9U6 primitive .accumulation( 'the process which takes
2
avay from the labourer his possession of thtro&ans of production' .vaa
far advanced. Whereas the process rested on the (use of state machinery
to maintain precapitalist relation* of production;.in the Reserves *
the development of the economy- and; the inherently contradictory nature
of this policy led to .their dissolution, and the peasantry were, .pro-
lctorianised, i.e. incorporated into capitalist relations of production.
The path of capitalist developmentjin .South Africa,generated both rural
impoverishment and-intense'urban poverty as the decreasing amount of
necessary product provided>byi He serve production was not replaced by
significantly higher wages in tha capitalist mode. Capitalist develop-
ment thus generated conflict.cot only over wages, but all facets of
urban and rural life. This structurally induced conflict centered 00
cheap labour,;bringing'into question the structure, of the system of
exploitation.' These conflict*- came to a head in the period 19U2.-6,
when the problem of political control over urban:. Africans became acute,
culminating in the 19*6 strike vith the use of massive repression to
stifle the challenge. All classes had then to develop new response* to
this conflict. After the fHert*o«Bills' of 1936: - disenfranchising
Africans in tho Cape in return for seven (white) parliamentary rep-
resentatives and an advisory Bative Representative Council and slightly
extending the area of the ^ Reserves - African protest and mobilisation
in the period under review were almost exclusively within the capitalist
node of production the source of structural conflict. The central
1. Union Statistics ... Loc. cit. Includes: traders; professional,
technical and related workers; managers,.administrators and officials;
and clerical and related workers; . • ,
r
2. K. Mnrx, Capital. Vol. I ((London* 1970), l\k* Italios added. .
3. Steenkonp, loc' cit. The post-19^1 rise in industrial wages is.
explained below. ' ' .
U. ThiB is not to dismiss peasant opposition. However 1936-U8, the.
primary thrust of African opposition was proletarian. The important
peasant revolts of the Fifties occurred after a new alignment of .class
forces had gained power and attempted to modify the system of exploita-
tion.
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question afcoufc..African opposition after 1936 revolved around.the
relationship between the. African petty bourgeoisie and the
ae manifested £n their re.spaotiy« organisation*. . ;,.. . "..•
_ Thi« i* a conQlez xel&tiiouehip vbiah I have examined tltewberc.
Very brief ly , the leading African p o l i t i c a l organisation, the African
Rational Conga* iff, .(A$C. ox Co«gr»»6}r rejected radical leadarihip .at
the outsat of ,tba 5 M r t i w , aut its- UoJ*» v i th Afirican trade unions
and.functioned alooet oxAlusively as a, disorganieod. organ of petty
bqurgeoi&.prptoft during th i s deqade. The fai lure of the ABC aad the
All African>,,Ccjpr^nAion oppositieo to the 'Berttog B i l l s ' f inal ly
brought hqqe[ t^ M. need fpr organised mass oppQaiitioa. During the war.,
the ANC ooD09g*jat*d on r^formiiia and rebuilding i t s organisational .
• t r u e t u r e . , , ,•.. . ; • .
 - f . . . ; , . . . . . -. • . , . . , . . _ . •
. -Moise yorrying to .&&&>noray*vit ,aa *ha Department of Labour.
Reports after 1936 make ojLeax?, wa« the staady growth of. Africa? trade
unionism i&.tba Thirtiaa and it.fi.ouahrooiaiag during thevar.. : iThoueh
without o f f i c ia l recogDiticn and aubject to a vide rnnga of legal ,aod
other re i t ra ip t t r by Scptwnber 19^5) tho Council of BoaTEuropcea. Tnsde.:
UnionB qlainwd »• national DeBbajnhip oX.-^ 1.^ 8t000. in 119 union*, enbrac-
ing more than ho% of the 390,000 Africans foployed in connaerce and
manufacturing, apd .CHOTU did not acootint,Xor; a l l African trada, union
membership.. In both the-iCape, sad.Itetal,- African .unioqs. were largely
 :
under the ,umbralla Q.f pAfa^le^-vhita u&i^pf * and, i^ any Afric&it.s -were
members of either mp.x«<lpr Coloured Unions. Wallet aaavrate figurM
are impossible,to obtain a» o f f i c i a l statietdca exclude ineq^er'sbip- of
non-reei^tared, i;.e. .AfpioaB, trade -unions, through the figures given
in various sources, i t i s safe to.-conclude tbyst by 19^5 at l eas t ko%
of Africans employed:in oppnqrce or private industry were unionised,
i f not .as 'fully paid, ^p mejabttra, at least as intermittent subscribers •
The growth of African trade unions 193O-U5 saw a corresponding
growth .in militancy. The number of 'non-whites' on strike f i r s t exceeded
1. D. Q'Meara. Claas and Katiomaisa in African. Resistance: Secondary
Induatrioliaation and -the • Developpervt of a. Maae W^Teoent in South Africa
1930^50. M.A; diaeertation. University of Su»e«x, 1973. . • ; -
2. On the ANC
 :1912-52 Boe,-P.; >J%liik»©'o 'history, The Rise of African •
Rationalists in South Africa (London, 1970) .and B..-J. & R. E. Simons,
d a s e and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950 (Hamendsvorth, 1969).
3. The In duet r ia l Legislation Cotmission claimed CHETU's figures were
^inflated' without disputing i t s very large membership in 19**5 (UO
62A951), para 153^. Also para 1U68> Muriel BprreU, t**-*** ttrA**
i i ( l T J 6
) ,   a 6 8  i l ,
Unionian : Johanne8bitfg. ^oTJi 9; and H# Q, Ringro^e, 'Trade
Unions in Hetal* 8.A. Jou;'nal of Economica. Xvi l i , 3 (1950), 271 and
283.
U. Ib id . , plus H. J. & R E. Simons, op. c i t . passim and E. Boux,
Tine Longer than Rope (Mactiaon, I96M passim.
that of Vhitwin'th* late UtttfflStfi.1" This tr«n<SVB* temporarily-'
MvorMd.Duritttf ittr BtpMialctft buf vitb the exeeptifflnf r6f 19*0, S
1933-46 the nwber of no»-vhdt* striker* conisi start ly1 atid often '
taooltrly wcaMtUA that of vttlte*.2 Th© iier«nflfe in militancy during
th« var is hoticWbl** Da tbt fro ytoar period11930-9 inclusive, a total
of 26,25^ Don-*bit*a 'stnio* *o*k "for an average of- 2. T'Matty* for a
total of 71.0T0 vJutfeV*. Hi ' **•> Vix years 19*0^? Htwlasive, the corres-
ponding figures" rose Co 5 ,^39** 'strikers; 'an average loWofr'U.2 per-
Btriker for a toteO: of 2S9i505 inanday^ . Iti W ? ; * rasn- of otrikeo in
CHETU'B caapaigii 'for a woakly ainiimjfa'Vag* of Uo/- led'^iretftly to • '
fMrther state action Krffeiinst Afritfan \mion». ^ir Meaaure 1*(5 of •
December 19^2 outlav^d otnriltes by African* with eeTerte eahctionaV
Disputes were to be submitted for arbitration. Within ten days of ita
promulgation, striking Afriottb* v«flre- ptfoaecuWtf. 'Despite 'fira instruc-
tiona1 to prdsecute *vhereV«* ^oositle*. iwtfte tvb years Wfcveen i t»
pronulgationahd December 19*A; Afrltiane wpre itoVolVftd in Home sixty
illegal atrikes. AlthOiSgh the unions were -strongly Startled to restrain
their member a, the Department of'fcabour Report' for 19U? complained
that 'Batirea eeeai-to beignbr'in*^ Vat Measure l**5;l. Before ttte praaml-
gation of the-Measure the Wage Boerf^ S Sras hot obliged to consider a
Union's conplaintW;! 'Tlte MeaiurVthUb' gave the first <fend only)' partial
recognition to African union* add Its oochinery*!TOs textensively'-'uaed.
The year 19&8/3 saw * spectaeMiar ia'creade 'in' the number 'of Africina
for'Vban thtf'Wag* BSard made determinations *'troa 1,08b- to 67,632.
union* 'virtually r»&opol-ided representetions under Var Measure
this partidlly1 illustratae- Weir ins^roBeritality in iiaprovlhc'the
wages and conditions of theij^-ttfitfoersi' '•• ' • • '•''
The real earnings of Afrlbattsin pritate industry Increased "by-
9.85G in the oight year period 1930/1-1939faQ* la' **» nexte i* years,
1. Official Statistics on industrial disputed do not differentiate
between Africans, ..Coloured.and-Asiao,.. , ... . ...
Z. These striked •ifaBe.-difi'ieult to Sustain.bdietVer. Unskilled
African labour, ctiulil be. rabidly refplaced, an&Jioiofts operateduade*. -
severe financial r^'stral-nts. Unless deetands w«r^1me1/-fl.uickiyf atrikers
vere usunlly compelled to return to work or the Reserves. Thus while
total Taanday lo'ss ia- 'non-vbi^*' -at**£H«B' cdnsisteritljr1 exceeds Vhit.es,
the average per striker i s loifsr> «»•• ' ' :. 1_ : . ._ . ' ' ' ' . . .-.!.:•
3. Dept. of Labour - Summarized Report I?1*]*, pexa 12; Race Relations
Sew, VII, 1 , pg. 2; and (1)09/19*?): 19< . ' ' '"..
k, Rei?ort> of the Department df'Labour . . . 1957 (UG 29/1958), U\ '-
Previously African unions bad applied successfully to the Board in
only three instances* ' ' . . . . . . . . ". '•.:. ' .....'.• •• •• • •> ••'• •
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thay rose 51. M- Like the present inerena© in African
earning*, this large rapid rise is not solely attributable to "Urn '•
increasing national Income dicing the. period,otherwise a correspond-
ingly higher increase in the first sight year period could be expected.
Protected by the racial pol ic i tsof the *tat* there was l i t t l * Obliga-
tion on employers to raise Yages-vith increased,profits. Indeed South
African economic history indicates $b&t al l significant wage increases
resulted from organised wrM'T^paore, The.growth of African trade
unionism certaisly altered the power position of African Vorfcoro, giving
then a veap^n, which, as the-strikes indicate, they vere not loath to .
use, and a-, number of these resulted..directly, in wage increases.-
African unions fhua played a key, though often difficult to determine,
role in the rise in African industrial earnings during this period*
Unlik« .the earlier Industrial, and Cpnaeraiel.Workers' Uoion (ICU),
the African trade unions of the Thirties-and Forties were organised on
an industrial baeis and designed to pweua. higher wages and improved
wording conditions for their members. This change--from tb« 'Mg . - -
unionism' of the ICU waa significant. It inplied a recognition of the
proletarian role and i t s utilisation'to confront the system <jf exploi-
tation at its source within the capitalist mode of production. The
rapid growth of trade.unionism reflected the growing consciousness of
the African proletariat - a recognition of the need for independent
class action;.that the conglomeration of peasantry, chiefs, proletariat
and petty bourgeoisie in the ICU prevented the single minded pursuit
of workers' Interests,^ Without the overt 'political' character of the
ICU, these unions vere objectively 'political' in a more fundamental
• M •• . . •• • •_-. > ' . ' . ' • ; , ' . . .
sense. In South Africa the pursuit of higher wages and improved work-
ing conditions for Africans was not just, a demand for a share in the
fruits of growth, but a direct challenge to the pattern of that growth
b"\sed on the racial division of labour as the instrument of rapid
capital.accumulation. The 1932 General Strike had shown that enfran-
chised white labour would resist dilution of i t s privileged position
1. A. M. K. Mv Spandau, Income Distribution:end Economic Growth in
South Africa, unpublished Ph.D., University of South Africa 1971,
Vol. I, Table l*7<b). • Spandau s^ figures are based on Steenkaop, loc.
cit, , but begin earlier. Stimulated.by the wartirae shortage of: st i l led
labour, the racial earnings gap temporarily narrowed I9U2-5 for the
first and only time. ' • ('
2. Race Relations Journal IX (19^*2), I l6 .
3. Though with an officially eatinatod membership of 11)6,000 in 1927
(Official Yearbook Ho. 11 1928/9 - this .figure is probably an over-
estimation) the ICU was a disorganised amorphous, largely rural, masa
protest movement rather than a trade union in the accepted sense.
Lacking orpaniaecl roots amongst workers, confused over its ains and
battered by. ideological and personal- leaderehip spl i ts , i t disintegra-
ted 1928-30.
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and a system of cheap labour could only be maintained vith its-active
connivance, a condition of vhich was protection from Competition from
black labour. Hence ttoe job and wage colour bare In which race differ-
entiated skilled from unskilled a&d which effectively closed avenues
of nobility to educated'Af*£ctas* In'its acceptance of the liberal
myth of •lcnr African adva&a* •Yithin tne framework of the existing
systeo and i t s concern for th* conditions of individual participation
and the mmovsJ. of barrivrt to sottial mobility, the AHC failed to
recognise tbat the alignment• of elafrs forces id South African capital-
ism frustrated these.aims* Ta« unions on tne other hand effectively
questioned the syste&r of exploitation baaed on a racially defined
cheap labour force. Tho significance of their growth l i e s not only In
their contribution to-the' aa**rtal welfare of their memberB and challenge
to the system of exploitation, but also in their role-in forging and
capitalising on a growing proletarian consciousness; and i ts effect on
on African'national'coaeciousMes-, illustrated1 most clearly by the
African miners* strife**; ; -t.. ?T • • i %' •.'*.'• -. • - :
The Gold Mining Induatrr ftftC the African Mine Workers' Union
The two largest groups of* African workers, mine nnd farm labourers,
remained unorganised in tne growth of trade unionism in ihe thirtiee.
The Communist Party (C.P.) hod tried to establish a mine workers'
union, but had been unable to solve tne problems of organising migrant
workers. Recognising i t could'not launch such a union on i t s own,
the Party changed tactics in April 19U1. Prodded by two African C.P.
members, Gaur Radebe and Edwin Mofutsanyana, respectively Secretary'
for Mines and Employment in the Transvaal AHC and Minister of Labour
in the ARC National Executive (known"as the Cabinet), the Transvaal
ANC convened a Conference in August' 19UI to discuss the formation of
an African mneworkers' union. The 60 delegates from 1*1 organisations
unanimously resolved to organise workers both on the mines and before
recruitment in the Reserves. A Corimittee of fifteen was elected to
raise fundB and 'build an;"African"Brine workers' union*, with J. B.
Marks as President, find JaawB^HajoTo, a leading meoiber of the tfitvaters-
.. .., ..—.. . ,
rand Native Mine. Clerks Association, as Vice-President. This latter
connection was important. Preelttnation 110 of 19^2 excluded 'nine
labourers' from the statutory cost of living allowance payable to a l l
industrial employees. The Chamber of Minos ruled that i t s 1,93?
African clarks fe l l within this category and -refused them the allow-
ance. Angered by the refusals the native Mine Clerks Association
affiliated to the .AMWU. P^h£^ Chombqr'9 compounds were closed to- AMW
1. Guardian 5.6.1+1 a Race TtelaftlonB WOTB III, 9 ( i9 k l ) , 1.
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officials'from the union's 'inception,' anS'lif was largely through
individual eontafrts betveeh' members of the Clerks' Association and
the working miners'that the'union "slowly grew', claiming 25
 f 000 members
in 19&V; Prom "the" beginning the 'union pressed" wage demands against
' • .• ' • . • ' • • • • • " ' < v i l f j ' • ' / : • • • . • • • ' • ' • ' ' i i ' ' ' '
a deaf Chanter. After a" oerieB of' stoppage's in February l£U3 and
representations'ITCC tbe" ARWU and tho African Gat and Power Workers'
Union, the government'appointed' a coianiasion xo' investigate the wages
and conditions of African miners.' 'The AWWU evidence in effect'called
for an'end to'^naa'p migrant labour. I t contained five basic demands:
regular wage increases; payment of a cost* of living allowance\ statu-
tory wage minima and' a Wage Board enquiry; the ' to ta l abolition of the
compound syBtco, the tribal 'diviaion of the workforce and al l r e s t r i c -
tions on freedom 'of abvement -"and f'inaliy, recognition' of the AMWU.'2
The report of the Mrisaowh'Coniniasibn, ia' :a fascinating'document.
Delving into al l aspecta'of African" labbur 6H the Bold kihes, i t
examineein great detail the'arguments of the Chamber of Mines, which
atresaed the in'dustryV dependence on cheap mirjrant labour," claimed
wages were 'perfectly adequate' in view of remuneration in kind and
Reaerve1 "production'! arid &eclared"the industry' was* hot" "in a position to
raise wages without effectively ahorten'ing i t s l i f e which would have
disastrous resultB for the optional'economy, Tho report illuminates
the structure of the'goid mining inaustry which is'worth examining.
Gold'mining is crucial to the South African economy. Develop-
ments affectihg i t have always influenced the delicate poli t ical rela-
tionahip between the national'and metropolitan fractions of the lour-
geoiaie. Hot only was i t the largest single industry accounting for
the great bulk'of the 16.2# wnich al l mining contributed to National
taccme in 19*+3, declaring dividends of '£if5.6m'(of which 5^^ were" declared
in South' Africa), but QIEO contributed massively to state revenue -
some £27. 3ci in 191*3. Though the total value of manufacturing output
exceeded that of a l l mining in 19**3, foreign exchange earned by Gold '
exports' (approximately 6c^' of totAl") larg'ftly paid, for the imported
'50$ of a l l fav-material8- uNd=>in induatrjr.. The needs and demands of
the Chanber thus''-ranlted *eary high in th* govttrnm*nt'«-priorities;ia.
framing poltijx-' "• •.-••• f ; - > - . • • • . : ' . •-.- . .• , - ••• *
.. . ... The .profitability constraint8 .and structure..o_f tlje. gold,raining
2. Inkululeko Tfo. ''j& Jo . f . '*3 . ' ' " :••-''.'•'.'..•-• "^"i: ' ..;':• . ' .
3. Report of the Witwatgrarandj.M^ne. Hative Wages ConaisBJon on. the
R3aunerafci.on'..and'i CpnclitlygB af'Batiloyment o f Natives on" the-1
rat:d Gold \ ^ ^ r ~ :
\ . Ib id . ,
industry were critical factor*, in the developnent of the racial pattern
of power and privilege in South Africa. Whilst the yitvatersrand reefs
are the largest ever discovered, they are very deep, dispersed, and of
lov yield ore. The realisation of profits required immense capital
expenditure, which, coupled with the. fixed price of gold and,the
inability to pass increased costs on to consumers meant these., bad to be
kept low. Of the two.major cost items, stores were subject to market
fluctuation and thus labour became,.the focus of cost minimisation. The
Mine owners had grouped together.to protect their interests in the
Chamber of Mines in 1689. Through a_standard average maximum wage
system, a recruiting monopsony in the WitvaterBrand Native Labour
Association and the Native Recruiting Corporation, and servile labour
measures (most obviously the compound system), the Chamber eliminated
competition.over wages, enabling consistently lov levels to.be..main-
tained almost.indefinitely. The basic underground cash wage for
African miners was 2/6d per shift in.1890, I-?8*;*? 193.5...and.2/- in
1&U2. These low wages were justified by the Reserve subsistence argu-
ment. . .
In August.I9U3, 308,37!* Africans were on the Witvatersrand Gold
Nines, 'approximately Qkf of the full complement of natives that could
be profitably employed1 , .'working a six day week. The average wage
was 2/ld for surface workers and 2/3d for underground workers. The
Chamber operated on 'average dqily maximum.wage system*, vhic^j, 'under
penalty', no,mine could exceed. In this way piece work earnings were
limited and. 'unfair competition* av-ided. In 19**3, l€% of al l African
workers earned less than,the average maximum wage of 2/3d per shift .
Increases were, not automatic, and only granted after considering a
recommendation from the individual African's white ganger, and no over-
. • ' • ' ' i t ; , , ' , t l . ' . ; * . . ' . • • ' " . . . . . .
time rates, sick or leave pay were granted. These meagre earnings were
• " ' ' • • • • . • : . ' • • • • 1 •. : . . : ' • - . 1 . . .
subject to deductions for boots, matresBes and other items totalling
• • • • : - - ; . . - . - . r j . : . . , . - • • • * " .
15*-of total earnings. . •
" In i ts investigation of.^he wage structure-pf the industryr the
CotniBsion exanined the nvpleoentary income from the Reserves on which
the: Chamber! s arguments, ga ins t increases rested.. . This section of the
report offers stark evidence of the decline of productivity, impoverish
1. ?. A. Johnstone, 'Class Conflict and Colour Bars in the South
African Goliminiag Industry 191O-261, Institute_of Commonwealth studies
Collected Seminar Papers Ho. 10, The Societies of Southern Africa fo1
the 19th & 20th Centuries (19T0) 112-26. Also- Lan.sdovn Report, op, .
c i t . , Table XXXI. :• '••• .
2. Ibid>i para 65.. .98% nere. *tribol Batives1, i . e ; migrants. The
fall in "African mine labour in 19*t2 reflects the,' enlistment of over
100,000 Africwia from South Africa and the High Coocdasion territories
for military service. Hereafter the 'foreign' labour ra^o rose rapidl;
3. Ibid., para 80-2 and Table IV; para 87-8 and 238.
ment, landletsness, never* malnutrition and-Health problens in the
Reserves - a 'cause for grave concern* - concluding that for the majority
of migrants, 'Reserve production irfbtft a myth'. Firstly it investiga-
ted changes in patterns of employment caused by impoverishment. The
tfonpoaition of the workforce shoved a rise in first-time recruits as
. . . it
re-recruitmeilt from South Africa declined. Of the. Labour recruited
froo the Free State* in 19**3, (I»2«T# were new redruits, vith high and
increasing percentages for the JCransvaal .flatal and-2ululand as ve i l .
The commission fpund that 'due. to'the deterioration of the Reserves'
the average stay in the Reserves betveen contracts for re-recruit a
van not the '12 months. 6f idleness1 claiaed by the Chamber, but had
declined from 8.1 months in 1931 to 1.6 months in 19-U2. Whereas in
1931, 56$ of all re-racruitB returne4 to the.mines within a year, by
19*0 this had risen to 6U%t more than half of whom returned within
five gonths. By the end of the seventh nonthV:bver JOJE of recruits
had returned to the mines, compared with the-ninth1 month in 1931.
Whilst suggesting.that at least the bulk of recruits from the Tranakei
and. Ciskei (i .a.UoJ of the total labour force in 1936) vere landless,
the Commission-calculated a series of budgets for a family-of five
with access to land, incorporating wages earned on the mines and cash
income from, and the value of own producia consumed in the Reserves.
Theao indicate that even a woriter permanently enfployed on the mine's.
wboBe family .bad- access to land: and In a Jflood year, would suffer a
shortfall .between.income and expenditure which had rocketed since 1939
from £1.13.8d to £10.U.l»d for a surface worker and from £0.0.2d to
£9.U,10d for an underground worker. With the exception of clerks and
indunna (lesa than 2% of the vbrk force), all African'miners were
obliged to return to the Reserves oh -completion of their lU month
contract, and the actual shortfalls were thus much larger. Table II
shove the extent of these over two years for various lengths of stay
in the Reserves and their rise in just four years.
These findings explicitly gave the l ie to the Chamber's pioua
claim that their 'perfectly adequate1 wages, together with Reserve
production, kept a miner's family-Tor hi* lU month contract, paid for
a further 12 montbs. of. "idleness1, 'leaving a large-1 margin to purchase
stock and-improve his standard of l iving'. For thejUl.2? of African
miners earning;2/- per shift or l ess , a stay or more than five months
in the Reserves meant a shortfall between income and expenditure over
a two year period greater than thei,r annual cash wage. For the further
2U% earning 2/ld-2/3d per shift, .this occurred after.a seven month-,
absence from the mines. Yet workers earning more than the miDinmm
wage vere only employed at the increased rate i f they returned to
1. Ibid., para 201 and 203 and Appendix 'I 1 ,
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 • S h o r t f a l l between Income and Expenditure
Ro. o f jaopfiha ..; •l"p, . • ™ '» •••"• ' - ' -" '^*" •'- ' " ' '"
spent in'Reserves 1 9 3 9 .
o v e r a 2&1 m o n t h " ' —•• ' • • • • • '•' ' •
period. :. _ , Surface ,.-, Underground Surface Underground
Worker , Worker , . Worker. . . Workjar .
( i . e . hypothetical £ a, d. -.£.••. d.".< . £ - 8 . d . « B i d .
full-time employment) , .
0 3 . f. V." . o ; O.'l*. 20. B. 8. 18. 9. 8 .
6 (mines 18) 16.12. Q._.. Ik. I. 9. • ' 3*». 1. 2. - 3 2 i l l . i l .
8 (mines 16) 21.18. p. 19.1.3. U. 39.U. 2. 38. 5. 2..
10(nines lU) 27. 1*. 1. 25. 5. 0. U5. 1. 2. U3.I8. 5-
The Conmijsioa'e genteel horror at conditions on the mines high-
light e the destruction of precapitalist relations of production in the
Reserves, with a labour force 'freed' fron the measft of production and
forced to sell i t t labour pover in order to subsist in appalling poverty.
Though there i s no direot cvidecoe on this point, the fal l in both re-
recruitinc froci, and the pn?portic« of the workforce originating in
South Africa (52.2* in 1936.*» 39.-3$ on. 19^6), coupled with the Chamber(c
perBietent complaint that higher..yogca in private industry vere deplet-
ing i ts workforce, would eugg$ft that ex-mine" esployeee were sailing
their labour-power at higher rojfcA4iirr manufacturing, joining the per-
3
nanent urban proletariat... .;:-,r- .... r
The Comoission's rocomnendationa aimed at. inproving the position
of the lowest-paid miners. Given' the profitability constraints of the
industry i t . recommended the continuation of the: migrant labour »Jrstex,
yet at vagea-providing 'a. proper livelihood1 , and the industry should
gear itself for a 'full* industrial wage for the landless. The full
recommend At ions were: a flat coat of living allowance of 3d per shift',
a boot allowance and free, or.eost price, repair service; new per shift
wage nvinJTVi of 2/2d for surface and 2/54 for underground worker* (over
86? of surface, and QO% of.iundarground workers 'earned- l e s s } , and payment
of an overtime rate with leave pay for long service employees. This
would incerase the.average nHTm*l earnings of surface workers by
£10.1f.0d and underground workers by Cll.lb.Td, virtually wiping-out the
1 / Chamber quoteB, Ibid.; pg. U 0 . The 'period of grace1 was" S months
for Mocsnbiqueans and 12 tor .'tropicals'. '
2. Compiled'ibid.,''tables MCVH-XXXX. '
3. See for example Transvnal Chamber of Mines (TCM), Fifty-Eiphth
Annual Report. Year. W 7 . 6U.
shortfalls and adding £2.6m to the annual wage bill. It wao argued
that the Chamber, whose members had declared a combined estimated
working profit of nearly £38m for 19^3 and paid out dividends of over
£15.3m together with £27.7m to the state, could well afford the extra
cost. Finally, whilst declaring itself in favour of 'some form of
collective bargaining' for Africans, tha Report concluded that African
miners '... hare not yet reached the stage of development which would
enable them Bafely and usefully to employ trade unionism as a means of
promoting their advancement', and that 'the public interests would
definitely negative' recognition of the AMWU.
Neither the Chamber nor the government fully accepted these
recommendations. Overtime and Sunday pay waa granted, and 'in lieu of
all other recommendations', surface pay vas increased by Ud per shift
and underground vageB by 5d. Contrary to recommendation, the cost was
borne by the taxpayer, through tho refund of the bulk of the Gold
Realisation Charge to pay for the increases.
The Report was considered at the annual AMVU conference in August
19M, This meeting spanned the spectrum of African politics, Attended
by 700 delegates from oveiy mine, 1300 rank and file members, the
President-General of the ANC, at least one NRC member and a number of
prominent trade unionists, it also received a telegram of support from
the Paramount Chief of Pondoland. Angry delegates called for a strike,
but were dissuaded by on executive anxious not to harm the war effort.
A compromise resolution described tho Lansdown rec oianendat ions as
'hopelessly inadequate and unsatisfactory', but urged their full
implementation as a step in the right direction, demanded a Wage Board
enquiry, and called on tho labour movement to protest against the
'continuous attempts of mining management to victimise and intimidate
3
active members of the African Mine Workers' Union'.
Both the Chonber and the government attempted to stifle the AMWU,
Giving evidence to the sedition trial following the 19*»6 strike, the
Compound manager of the New Kleinfontein Mine admitted Africans 'were
not allowed to organise1, and that it was Chamber policy, followed on
all mines, 'to get rid o f anybody trying to organise workers. At the
1. Lansdown Report, op. cit., para 2U-2; and 287-317, 320-3, U66-7.
Italics added.
2. TCM, Fifty-Fifth Annual Report. Year 19UU. pg 25.
3. Iritululeko. No. 60, 26.8.19UU.
M. Quoted in 'Report of the Trial of Conmiunist Leaders in South Africa',
Freedon (Double No. 1 Ss 2) April 191*7, 15. For Chamber policy on
African Trade Unionism see its, Tribal Watives and Trade Unionism.
(Johannesburg, November
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same trial, Senator Basner claimed the Council bad insinuated a spy
into the AMWU Council. Despite harrassment, toe union grev steadily,
claiming 25,000 members in I9M1. In August of that year, following
representation! from the Chamber,. War Measure IU25 vaa promulgated,
prohibiting gatherings of more than 20 persona on proclaimed mining
ground. This was later acknowledged by the AMWU president to be the
beginning of its undoing. With the Compounds nov out of bounds to
its officials, meeting had new to be held clandestinely at night under
the nine dumps* The enrolment of new members and collection of sub-
scriptions became increasingly difficult, income dropping fron £120
to £30 .per month, and the columns of Inkululekq regularly reported the
arrest of AMWU officials for contravening the ban on large meetings.
A maee emergency conference of March 19**5 demanded the repeal of the
Measure and the retrospective enforcement of the Lanadowa recommenda-
tions. In June an AMWU delegation met the Acting Prime Minister and
other Cabinet Ministers, unsuccessfully pressing these claims and a
demand for a general wage increase.
The situation gradually escalated. South Africa suffered severe
food shortages in 19^5• Rations were cut on all mines in July, and
canned beef substituted,for fresh meat. The AMWU President wrote
that the miners', grievances were further aggravated by 'the quality
and quantity of food they get' and described the formation of workers'
-committees demanding better food. At Crown Mines, 5,000 workers
refused to accept food from the mine kitchen. In March 19U6 a food.riot
developed in which one man vaa killed and forty injured when police
broke up a protest outside the kitchen at. the Modderfontein East Mine,
and 2,000 miners at Hew Kleinfontein attended a protest meeting on the
food situation.
Clearly an explosion was coming. The 2,000 delegates to the
April 19^6 AMWU conference drew up. a statement demanding: a minimum
daily wage of-10/-; family housing; 2 weeks paid annual leave; a £100
gratuity after 15 years' service; payment of repatriation fores; and
repeal of War Measure 11)25. Again an implicit demand for the stabilisa-
tion of the work force and an end to migratory labour. Numerous
letters to the Chamber vent unanswered. Senator Basner tried without
success to get the Chamber to negotiate with the AMWU. Similar attempts
by all seven African parliamentary representatives to interview the
Prime Minister and Minister of Labour were unavailing. In June the
annual conference of the Transvaal Council of Non-European Trade Unions
1. Marks quoted in B. J. & R, E. Simons, op. e'it., 572; M. Benson,
Struggle for a Birthright (Harmondsworth 1966), 98; Inkululeko, Ho. 72,
10.3.W5 and Ho. 79, 9.6.I9U5.
2. Ibid., No. 91, 28.1.U6; Ho. 81, 28.7.*+5; and No. 93, 11.3.W.
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unanimously pledged full support to the AMWU in tho event of a strike.
The-situation reached its climax in August. According to a police
witness» at a special open air conference on Sunday kth a resolution to
strike was moved from the floor and unanimously adopted by the 1,000
delegates. Another police witness testified that Marks and other
speakers 'emphatically' warned against the use of violence by the
strikers.
The strike tegan on the morning of Auguet 12th. Estimates of
the nunber of participants vary. The C,P. paper Inkululeko jubilantly
put the figure at 100,000, while the Johannesburg Star and Die Trangvaler
reported only 50,000. Official labour statistics speak very precisely
of 62,091 strikers and the only Chamber of Mines reference to the
strike puts the figure at 76,000 of the Reef's 306,000 miners. Like-
wise there in some discrepancy in reports of the number of mines
affected. Working from the notes of participants, the Simons claim
that 12 mines were brought to a standstill and production partially
paralysed on 9 others. Reports in the' Star and Tranavaler conflict.
After the strike, both claimed that only 17 of the U5 mines on the
Reef vere affected, with a total stoppage on 5 and a further 12 either
partially closed or affected. Yet their daily report names 19 mines,
9 totally stopped and with production partially stopped or affected on
a further 10. Monthly production fe l l between July and August on 31
of the 1*5 mines, with total monthly production down by l69(8OO tons to
the lowest level since 1937• Unfortunately details of the national
origins of the strikers are unavailable, though given the decline of
the Reserves, I should speculate that they would reveal a dispropor-
tionate number of South Africans.
Official reaction was swift and violent. To the Head Council
of hie ruling United Party, Prime Minister Smuts declared himself 'not
unduly concerned1. The strike was the result of agitation, not of
legitimate grievances, and 'appropriate action' was being taken. This
action consisted of paralysing the leadership whilst police attacked
miners with rifles and clubs, 'It can now be revealed' confided the
Star after the strike, that 1,600'police were put on special duty as
reinforcements were rushed to the Rand and the compounds sealed off
1. Guardian, 25.U.U6, Inkululeko. No. 97, First Issue June 19^6 and
Freedom, op. c t t . , pg 30 & 10.
2. Inkululeko. Wo. 99, August 19**6i Die TranevfLLer. 13.8.1*6; The Star,
12.8.1*6-, Dept. of Labour Raport I9A6 (UG 62/19**Q); TCM Fifty-Seventh
Annual Report, pg 26.
3. H, J. & R. E. 6imona, op. c i t . , pg 5751 The Star and Die Transvaler
16,8.1*6 and 12.8-17.8.1*6; TCM, 'Monthly Analysis of Gold Production in
the TranBvaal1 , July and August 19**6, Annual Report 19**6 op. c i t . 113.
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under armed guard. An emergency meeting of the Transvaal Council of Trade
Unions held on the 13th issued a call for a General Strike in U8 hours.
The ABC President-General and the Transvaal and Ratal Indian Passive
Resistance Councils pledged full support. Police burst into this meet-
ing, arrested J. B. Mirks, President of the AMW and Chairman of CSETU,
and raided AMWU offices* On the same day, police fired on strikers at
the Sub-Higel nine, reporting six killed by rif le fire and a further six
trampled to deatt in the ensuing panic* The next day, miners staging
a sit-dovn striks underground were baton charged and driven up 'stope
by stope, level by level* to the surface and back into the compound where
they could be fully controlled. Groups from the West Springe, City Deep
and Sinner and Jack Mines marching tovards Johannesburg to see the Chief
Native Connissioner were 'dispersed* by the police. Mich was aade of
this starch, the Press claiming a profusion of Weapons' indicated an
intention to 'attack* the.city. Yet at the subsequent sedition tr ia l ,
the prosecution could establish no native other than the desire to recover
passes lodged vith the Commissioner and return to the Reserves. Police
witnesses agreed under cross examination that at no time did the officer
in charge ask the miners wLy they were going.to Johannesburg, and. until
charged by the police, the crowd had been 'good humoured1 and 'peaceful*.
On the ll+th, the hitherto conservative Native Representative Council
(RRC), after a series of unprecedented verbal attacks on government
policy, unanimously resolved to suspend sittings of their 'toy telephone*
in angry and vehement protest at the government's refusal to discuss
the strike. A CNETU mass meeting to discuse a Qeneral Strike was banned
by the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg, and 600 police sent to break i t
op before i t even started. The Chairman of the Strike Committee, James
Phillips, was arrested together vith other prominent black trade unionists
and radic&laof all races. By Friday 16th, 68 people had appeared in
court charged under the Riotous Assemblies and Native Labour Regulation
Acts. At a meeting of the arrefit*-depleted CHETU strike committee on
the 17th, two prominent African trade unionists, Qana Makabeni and Daniel
Kosa, proposed its dissolution, withdrawing vhen defeated. The committee
adjourned vithout taking any; further decisions and did not meet again.
Isolated in that moat effective instrument of social control, the com-
pounds, battered hy brutal police attacks, cut off from i t s leadership
and disheartened by the- lack, of visible support, "the strike collapsed.
The last of the strikers returned to work or the 17th. Though the number
of casualties vaa never made known, at least 12 Africans vere reported
killed and over 1,200 injured. The Chamber of Mines never reported
fully on the strike, i t s I9h6 annual report containing six curt lines
of statement, and the government refused to appoint a commisBion of
inquiry.
1. Details from: Inkululeko Bo. 99; The Stax and Die Transvaler. 12.8.U6"-
17.8.U6; Freedom loc. c i t . and Vol. V, 5, October-November 19**6.
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Aftermath of the Strike
In terms of iti objectives the strike vao a dismal failure,
unable to be sustained by the tenuovs AMWU organisation in th» face of
mastive. state repression. Rot until 19**9 was a further increase of
3d per shift granted, a far cry from a 10/- minimum wage, and still
short of the recommendations of the 19W* Landsdown Report. Yet the
'significance and resultB of the strike far transcend its failure.
Thi3 largest strike in South African history (in terms of participants
though not mandaya lout) was undertaken by migrant workers. It vas
those very workers on whose backs the edifice of the cheap labour system
rested, these still supposedly peasant migrant*, whose action in the
industrial sector spotlight*! the erosion of the economic base of cheap
labour and the shift in the basis of exploitation to relations of pro-
duction within the capitalist node of production itBelf. Recognising
their proletarian role» they delivered a challenge to the system of
exploitation far stronger than any hitherto offered by the political
organisations of the African petty bourgeoisie. The structural con-
flict of the period 1930-1*5 culminated in the strike, which threw the
problem of control into sharp relief, accentuating the growing debate
orer the future patterns of control. The violence of the state's
response not only indicated the degree to which it felt threatened,
but foreshadowed the extreme repression after 19U8. Only the War
provided en equal catalyst in the polities of the Forties, and the
Strike prompted a vigorous response from all classes. There are also
obvious parallels between this and the 1922 General Strike of white
workers. Both were revolts against a wage policy of the Chamber of
Mines which a Smuts government supported. In both. Smuts came down
on the side of the mine ovnert with ruthless force, and was thrown
but of office at the following general elections as a result of the
contradictions highlighted by the strike.
By reflecting the structural changes since 1930, the strike
immediately prompted desperate efforts by the U.P. government to defuise
strident African demands for change. Casting around for alternatives ,
Smuts offered to enlarge the native Representative Council to fifty
elected members, give it executive powers, including taxation, and
extend partial recognition to the African trade unions. Whilst there
vas general recognition within the U.P. of the need to adjust the system
of exploitation to the structural changes, there were substantial per-
sonal differences within the Party as to the desired extent of change
(immediately after the strike Smite19 had seen the need for modifica-
tions whilst his liberal deputy, Jan Rofmeyer, had stood on his dignity,
apparently regarding the strike and NBC suspension as insults to his
good intentions). Moreover, given the class basis of the United Party,
important splits occurred between fractions of the bourgeoisie over
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future policy. Smuts was faced with irreconciloable*t the African
demand for change; the response of key fractions of the bourgeoisie
vithin his own Party | and that of the electorate at large.
The mineovners responded vigorously to the structural changes and
the perceived threat to their interests, stating their position on a
number, of issues very clearly. Accession to the strikers' demands or
even a movement towards them would have undermined the cheap labour
system with'only tvo possible- results - a fal l in mining profits or a
reduction in white wages. At a special ffl&frting two months after tbe
i strike convened* to consider Hha rising tide of vorkiagcosts which i s
threatening:the industry ant/its future development', the Chamber
claimed that a daily wage of 10/- would close 35 of the 1»5 existing
sines, produoing nass unemployment. ;This was followed by an unpreceden-
ted flocd-of public rs-lation« material setting out the Chamber's posi-
tion on African trad*.unionism (violently opposed), Oold mining taxes
(far too heavy - the Chamber was reluctant 'to pay for' further indus-
trialisation), migrant labour (beneficial for a l l parties concerned)
and general 'Sfctive policy', as the Chamber flexed i t s considerable
political muscle. In i t s evidence to the Fagan Commission) the Chamber
argued-that a switch, from aigr&tory to stabilised labour could only be
offset by a drop in white learnings, forbidden by law, and which would
meet tbe 'strenuous and bitter' opposition of the organised white '
working class. - -.,.•*
Siiiilarly, the strike forced businessmen in manufacturing and
commerce into a re-enwrinstion of the^ systm of exploitation* high-
lighting the:tensions within the ruling class which.had been" building
up since the end of the war. Tbe fall in the Reserve contribution to
the subsistence necessary for. the reproduction of labour put pressure
on wages, presenting capital with the problem of falls in profit levels.
The structural conflicts generated vere distinctly unhealthy for business.
By 19^5, for non-Afrikaner.secondary industry, the process of primitive
accumulation appeared to have-reached a stage where direct state coer-
cion and control of labour was no longer necessary. The huge expansion
and increasing capital intensity of industry during tbe war accelerated
the need for both skilled labour and higher productivity. Industry
waa prepared to invest in both, and the migrant system with i t s atten-
dant social and political costs appeared inconducive to both. After
tbe strike a move towards the creation of a stable, urban labour force
1. TCM, 'Proceedings at tbe Special Meeting Held in Johannesburg,
Friday 25th0ctober 19**6'i tribal Hativea and Trade Unionism, op. c i t . ;
Gold Mining Taxation. P.R.D. series Bo. 1. 19U5: The Sative Workers
on the Witvatersrand Gold Mines. P.R.D. Series Ho. 7. 19U7: Bative
Lavs Commission of Enquiry: Statements of Evidence submitted by the
Gold Producers' Cqw<fc»-ff r****"**"*"^! April ~~
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crowded and impoverished, and that the bulk of the African population
had been permanently and irreversibly urbanised. The foundation of
Native policy, the 'Stallard Jbrmula' which stipulated that Africans
should leave urban areas when they 'ceaBed to minister1 to the needs
of Whites, vas declared 'an untenable proposition'. The Report con-
cluded in Italics that 'legal provisions or an administrative policy
calculated'to perpetuate migratory labour and put obstacles in the
way of i ts stabilisation are wrong and have a detrimental effect. The
policy should be one for facilitating and encouraging stabilisation.
On the other hand, however, migratory labour cannot be prohibited by
lav or terminated by administrative action'.
Thus the strike highlighted the tensions in the ruling class and
the policy choices open to the state, reflected most clearly in the
Tagan Report. The manufacturing and commercial bourgeoisie wanted a
stabilised labour force - to be financed largely by higher taxation of
the nev Free State Gold fields - whilst unless they could do the pol i -
tically impossible and reduce white wages, the mine owners wanted the
migrant system of cheap labour to continue, and mining taxation reduced.
Both groups were represented politically in the United Party, in i t ia l ly
established in 193I1 to unite warring factions of the bourgeoisie, and
the party vas torn both ways. Whereas in both the General elections
i t had previously won it had been able to mobilise support on over-
riding issues, the crisis of capitalism in 1938 and the war in 19*3*
not only had i t been largely deserted by the rural bourgeoisie on the
war issue in 1939, but was now split On key issues of national policy,
and in trying to have it both ways, fe l l betveen two stools'. On the
other hand, by 19I18 the once bitterly divided ggrenigde (re-united)
Nationalist Party had no such problems and a very clear policy.
The structural changes highlighted by the strike put further
pressure on the governmeot. After the war, the African influx into
skilled positions vas slowed by a number of factors, the first of which
vae large-scale, government-sponsored immigration to South Africa.
Whereas the annual total had never previously exceeded 8,000, there
was a net immigration of 20,922 whites in 19^7t rising to 28,097 in
I9I+8. More important was the reaboorption of 250,000 Servicemen into
the economy after the War. War Measures 16* of 19^0 and 38 of 19U1
provided that men who left c iv i l occupations to render military service
were to be reabsorbed into th*M at the end cf the var and could not
be dismissed for at least six months. By the ead of 19**5. 1*5,020
whites and 7,316 Coloured had been reabsorbed under these measures.
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This not only slowed the movement of Africans into skilled rolei, but
created tensions between both black and white, worker a and the predom-
inantly Afrikaans-speaking white working class and the.state. Indus-
trial unrest amongst vtite workers rocketed after the war as they felt
their carefully-carved out niche of privilege, based on a rigid racial
differentiation between, skilled and,unskilled, threatened. The,number
on strike POM.from 1,521 in. 1?1»5 to 11,539 in_19*6 and 22.26U the.. .
following;.year., .the corresjwnding manday loss rocketed from 6,039 \o
58,55** to.a staggering 69^,937 in 19.^ 7. . This huge latter figure, is,
explained by a massive stoppage of white building workers in protest
at the government's training scheme for African, bricklayers. The
Nationalist Party capitalised on this discontent over labour policy
and the distribution of supplus. Dot only had the Party-sponsored
Reform. Movement captured control over the Minevorkers' Union in I9U7,
but the Blaokewerkersbeskeraiingahond (literally the white workers'
protection society) made considerable headway amongst other unions, and
the nine working class constituencies captured by the N.P. for the first
t^ me in 19^6, were, sufficient, to put i t in power*
Similarly, the two. other, Afrikaans-speaking groups, farmers and
petty bourgeoisie, reacted against these developments. The Afrikaner
reaction ie explained by the. relative deprivation of Afrikaans-speakers.
Although •comprising overv 6p)J of .the white population, in I9U6 Afrikaans-
speakers, made up 88Jaf unskilled white workers and 86X of farmers, but
only 36X of professional and.technical workers and lees than 25$ of.
administrative and executive, worker a. The total share of Afrikaans-
speakers in income from the private, qector of the economy was only
2U.8* in 19U8/9,aad pnly %$$ if, agriculture i s excluded. In 1939
only 1,200 of the 5,505 industrial establishments were owned by
Afrikaners, producing an even smaller proportion of total output. If
the period 1933-1*8 was one of pure bourgeois power (the labour Party
having destroyed i ts class basis in the Pact government), i t was pri-
marily the English-speaking industrial bourgeoisie which benefitted.
The total value of agricultural production increased 82JC 1932-9 and
192JC 19*0-50, yet this is far short of the corresponding ll*0X and 2*6)f
2
increases in the value of manufacturing output. The prosperity of
the agricultural sector rested.on active state intervention to secure
labour and spread sarplua. • The network of labour controls, state
marketing boards* the extensive aystem of state credit and universally
IV -Department-or LBbour-Report«^^5 (US-9/19**7) 8 and 19"*7 (UG 38/
2. S. Von Wyk, Die Afrikaner in die Beroepslewe'van die fitad-(Pretoria
1968) 207-10; STATS 15.12,68; B. Bbnting? The Rise of the South African
Reich (Harmondsworth, 1969), 378; and Union Statistics ••. S-3.
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huge subsidies together with the educational programmes and research
projects were all vital to its continued solvency. Given the low pro-
ductivity of South African agriculture, fanners were unable to compete
with the higher urban vages secured by Africans during tho war, which,
.if coupled with the threatened erosion of the migrant labour system
and relaxation of labour controls would severely have affected their
supply of labour.
The apparent decision of the Smuts government to relax labour
controls likewise threatened infant Afrikaner industrial and commercial
capital, conceived early in the century and delivered by the midwifery
of the Economies Volkekongres (peoples' economic congress) amidst much
fanfare in 19391 where a coherent strategy for the growth of an exclu-
sively Afrikaner capital was developed. For the aspirant capitalists
in the professional groups which dominated the leadership of the N.P.,
the necessary capital for it to emerge BB a fully fledged bourgeoisie
depended on the high levels of surplus value appropriation provided by
the cheap labour system and they resisted any move towards a stabilised
2higher wage force. TOT this .group control of the state machinery
meant access to crucial resources, allowing i t to enter capitalist
competition at the stage of finance capital, and in effect, f i lter i ts
ownership of the means of production downwards.
The official organ of the Transvaal N.P. described the strike as
'a direct result* and 'yet another of the fruits o f the government's
racial and labour policies. The N.P. election platform concentrated
on mobilising these three Afrikaans-speaking classes through both
intense manipulation of cultural symbols, and more importantly, ant
hysterical, raciBt emphasis on 'the colour question1, which subsumed
the fears of all three. Much was made of the ambivalence of U.P.
racial policy. N.P. propaganda stressed i t s own dependence on both
the rural, bourgeoisie and and workers, emphasising i ts determination to
expand the capitalist claBS and reduce the dominance of mining in the
economy. The victory of the Rationalist/Afrikaner Party in 19b8 must
1. E. P. du Plessis, 'n Volk Staan OP (Pretoria 196*0. The use of
the term 'Afrikaner capital' is not to introduce 'ethnic* analysis,
but points to a fraction of the bourgeoisie (in 19**6 largely an aspirant
bourgeoisie) which self-consciously maintained a cultural exclusivity
both as a strategy of accumulation and to undermine the metropolitan
bourgeoisie.
2. This is not to argue they favoured an unaltered retention of migrant
labour in the face of the dissolution of i t s economic base, but that
labour controls etc. were to be extended to maintain a high rate of
accumulation. Apartheid is best explained as the attempt by these
classes to retain a system of cheap labour in a different form. See
Wblpe, op. c i t .
3. Die Transvaler. 13.8.19*16, on the strike, and 21.fc.b8 for the HP
election manifesto written by Dr. Malan, entitled 'Waarheen Suid Afrika:
Die AUesoorheesende Kleurevraagetuk sal die Toekoms Bepaal' (The al l
embracing colour question will determine the future: Whither South
Africa?).
be seen as the reaction of these three classes - Afrikaan•-speaking
workers, farmer• and petty bourgeoisie - to developments in the social
formation highlighted by the strike, focussing on labour policy and
the distribution of Burplus between classes. Following the withdrawal
of Rertzog from the U.P, on the war issue in 1939, these three classes
had increasingly switched their support to H&lan's Nationalists. In
the 19^3 General Election, despite its opposition to the war, the H.P.
increased its share of seats from 2T to &3, all at the expense of the
U.P.» and in 19^8, on a minority vote, the N.P./A.P. coalition won a
majority of 5 in the Bouee of Assembly. The rural bourgeoisie were once
again the largest group in a governing daBB alliance. Yet the Party
was led by Professional men, the aspirant capitalists of the Beddings-
daadbond. One of the more dramatic features of South Africa's port-'U8
growth has been the rise of Afrikaner capital under this group and the
growing strains in the class alliance.
The effect of the strike and its ruthless suppression on African
political groupings was as dramatic, and the direction of African
opposition changed fundamentally, The patient expression of grievances
by an elite in dignified and constitutional councils gave way to mass
action and passive resistance! The unanimous decision of the Native
Representative Council (KRC) to suspend its sittings, together with
its unprecedented list of demands - abolition of the pass lavs, recog-
nition of African trade unione, repeal of the Urban Areas Act and direct
African representation at all levels - gave an immediate indication
of the changing nature of African opposition, and caught the govern-
ment totally unawares. Comprised of the Union's most 'respectable'
Africans, the RRC represented primarily the chiefs and petty bourgeoisie,
precisely those groups which, concerned with the conditions for individual
participation had insisted on working for reform from within the system
and refused to countenance direct action. The language of the debate,
the extent of the demands and the suspension itself were all unpreceden-
ted steps - a symbolic rejection of dependence by that group which for
so long had accepted government promises. A second immediate result of
the strike was the trial of 53 trade union, ARC and CP officials for
aiding and abetting an illegal'strike, followed immediately by the
trial of-the entire Central Executive Coamittee of the CP on sedition
charges arising out of the strike, eventually quashed in 19^8. These
trials were important in forging links between the largely white CP
leadership and' previously hbfltila members of Congress, producing a
broad .set of leadership contacts which were vital in the non-racial
Congress alliance movement in the fifties.
just as in white politics, the aftermath of the strike saw the
merging of most elements of African opposition into a class alliance
articulating a radical nationalist'ideology. The strike and the state's
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response illustrated the futi l i ty of the constitaxtional protest pursued
for so long by the ABC, together vith the considerable physical dangers
:
 of traaeinibn membership. Vnilirt-it vis followed by the development
' of the AHC into a mass nationalist movement,- the purely class organisa-
tion and mobilisation of the Africa* proletariat which paaked in 19^5/6
began to decline as proletarian discontent was channeled increasingly
into 'political' opposition tirthe ABC.' In 1950, the Industrial Legisla-
tion Commission reported that' 66 African1 unions had recently become
defunct and total paid up: African membership of trade unions had fallen
to Just over S^ OOC*.1 ' ; i . .
The deVelbpment of* this class alliance reflected both the struc-
' tural changes and the changing interests of the component classes
vis-a-vis the state, highlighted by the strike. During the period
under review, the peasantry WH!S proletarianised under the particular
form of exploit&ion maintained by the state, droving African trade
unionism in1the war, culminating in the ndrie strike, brought this
proletariat'" tnto direct confrontation with the repressive machinery of
the state which facilitated i t s exploitation. ttowever, i t VM the
Changing Intflr'ests of the African petty bourgeoisie vis^t-vis the state
which made the'ciass alliance possible. Prior to 1936, the existence
of the non-racial qualified franchise in the Cape placed this class in
an ambiguous position. Not only"was i t a visible goal to which elements
' of this class outside the Cape could and did strive, but i t offered an
" avenue of access to state power and meant that the petty bourgeoisie
were not as oppressed ab the proletariat. Whereas before the abolition
of the Cope'franchise in 1956 the political organisations of the petty
bourgeoisie concentrated on attempts to widen their avenue of mobility,
this was now closed," and they were-lumped together with the proletariat
u part of a supposedly undifferentiated, exploitable supply of labour.
Vith both their positions now ordered solely in terms of the racial
division of labour and pattern of power, the partial conflict of interest
was largely'erased and a political alliance between these classes a
possibility. This did not develop overnight, however. It was delayed
by the freak conditions during the war with hints that the racial
division of labour may be dissolved from above* Whilst the political
alignments and strengths of the various white classes made this impos-
sible, this only really became apparent after the mine strike, when the
movement towards an alliance began in earnest.
1. (UG 62/1951) para 1U91-15OO. There are many reasons for this decline.
•The strike and the debacle of CNSIU'a 'general strike' broke the Council's
back. Many of , i ts leaders were prosecuted and moved into the political
arena. The African trade union movement did not really pick up again
t i l l the emergence of the non-racial South. African Congress of Trade
thiona in the Fifties. See Horrell, op. c i t .
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For much of the period under review there waa l i t t l e contact or
co-operation between the.,African trade union movement and the ANC,
They remained organisationally distinct, each with i t s separate interests,
membership and leadership. The war oav the slov convergence of interest
*nd the beginning of co-operation between their respective leaderships.
The first breach in the rigid.olass bifurcation of African opposition
since the twenties occurred with the organisation of the AMWU in 19^1,
the AlfC's first tentative plunge into the. deeper waters of labour
organisation. Yet there were also conflicts, particularly over C.P.
influence in the unions - and i t was only after the 19^6 stride that
class divisions began to blur and a common leadership develop. With
the virtual collapse of the trade union movement after 19^6, prominent
African trade unionists moved into important ARC leadership positions.
The transformation of the ARC from the political organ of the
African petty bourgeoisie into the political.movement of a class a l l i -
ance did not isioply occur mechanistically as on enlightened leadership
ianediately perceived where i t s class interest .lay. Rather i t was
preceded by critical changes and much conflict within Congress i tself .
During the war the ANC hod been moving.away from i t s narrow base of
the Thirties, There were however.numerous,constraints. Congress was
subject to a wide, complex rang*.of,.ideological pressures. The pre-
dominant.. Christian vision of non-racial justice together with the per*
ception of tfce United States.as.the. great model of racial interdepen-
dence Lad to a,conservatism which clashed with, the eclectic radicalism
produced, by a-fusion of Qarveyism- with the influence.of the C.F. The
I.C.U., the Joint Council.movement and the All.African Convention all
added to the matrix of influences on the movement. Its coherence and
credibility voa reduced.by many personal and. tribal rivalries. Founded
in 1912, and s t i l l controlled by i t s founders in the Thirties, a degree
of generational confliat. developed which culminated in the effective
takeover of Congress by i t s militant Youth. League in 19^9. Centered
in the Transvaal, the League f,s members bad lived all their l ives under
the oppressive shadow of a single, national fiative policy, uninfluenced
by the liberal. 'Cape Tradition1 > This absence <tf the influence of the
Cape Tradition was crucial, as it. was CYL members who first articulated
the need for a class alliance (though in very different terms from that
which actually emerged). The League was the first section in the main-
stream of Congress for wham the ideal of liberation lay in the future
•••with ne*, African • inspired, initiatives, rather than a return to a pre-
vious condition under white direction. As the influence of the CYL
slowly moved the petty bourgeois politician! in the ARC into a more
. militant posture, the Ideological and strategic emphasis' shifted, from
the conditions for individual participation in the system to the libera-
tion of the mastea. Toe miners1 strike and the government's reaction
was the vital catalyst in changing the attitudes of the established
AHC and RBC leadership. The size of the national executive was enlarged
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in 19U6 and for the first1 tine since 1930, and a number of C.P.
mesibers were elected to I t . Under the dual influence of the CYL and
C.F. members1, toe ABC Leadership began to accept the need for direct
action in the form of passive resistance. likewise in the period
immediately after the strike, foundations were laid for co-operation
between the various oppressed groups in a broad political struggle *
In March1 19^7 the leader a of tna ARC and the Transvaal and Ratal Indian
Congresses signed the Xuas^laialcer-Dadoo Pact:, a six point agreement
to work together for a uniirersal franchise and the abolition of a l l
forms of discrimination.
The election of the Mai an government in toy 19U6 accelerated the
radicaliaation process. At the 19^9 Rational Congress, Dr. Xuma was
defeated for the Presidency by the CYL candidate Dr. Moroka, and Con-
gress adopted the 'Program of Action'. Tha basis of ANC policy during
the Fifties, the Program esphasieed the right to self-determination under
tho banner of African Rationalism, rejecting any form of vhite leader-
ship. Through the boycott of all discriminatory institutions and the
tactical use of civil disobedience, strikes and non co-operation., mass
support vas to'be generated. 'The Program was Implemented in the
Defiance campaign of 1992, timed to coincide with the tercentenary
celebrations of white settlement. This campaign In which 8,577 volun-
teers offered themselves for arrest sharply increased Congrtse member-
ship which rose from an estimated U,000- in 19**9 to 7• 000 just before
the Defiance Campaign and then rocketed to nearly 100,000 with many
times that number politically/ aware supporters.
Tbus the period which began with a split in African opposition
along class lines ended with a growing alliance between these forces.
Despite the petty bourgeois nature of the ANC, i t s turn to the pro-
letariat vas inevitable. The CYL called for mass action and by 19**6
the masses were no longer the peasantry in the Reserves but the urban
proletariat. lacking a strong bourgeois dynamic. Congress bad to
develop a popular base or collapse, and given the social effects of
twenty years of development, this was essentially proletarian in
character. The process of proletarianisation was accompanied by the
growth of on increasingly militant proletarian opposition which
effectively questioned the structure of the system of exploitation cul-
minating in the '1*6 strike - the severest challenge the system had
received. The violence of the state's response indicated that neither
the ARC's constitutionalism nor the 'economic' opposition of the trade
unions could confront i t successfully on their own, pointing to the
need for a united political movement. Thereafter proletarian opposition
was channeled into the ARC which was i t se l f transformed by i t s new
class bases and emerged from the Forties with a character very differ-
ent from that with which i t entered the decade. The trade union movs-
1. Walshe, op. c i t . , UO2-3.
ment generated a class .oauc*ou«nefl8 into vbicfe Congress could'
its root*,- finally giving i t se l f a secure political haw, and v&Len
reacted in turn oo the growingnational oonsciouanesft propagated toy
thr Youth I«agilef raiaicg it. to a: higher $££ch« The 'African National-
iianf and the goals •expressed; i s the Freedom Charter were, very different
from the- anti^soeial*st* indivioj^&list 'Africafiisja1 ,of the original
CSL manifesto fendearly policy stnteuwnts. &$ qnly vert they conaider-
*faly .more radical, disple^ng ao enhanced concern vita the material
position of ±h& proletariat, but showed an increasing awareness of the
role of the capitalist mode of production in itself producing and
'reproducing the systemOf'exploitation. Yet by the time the ANC
emerged at tbe head of a non-racial mass movement in too Fifties» the
state vafl in the hands of another class aliiaape born out of the struc-
tural Changes and determined to maintain a high rate of capital
accumulation in order to Consolidate Afrikaner capital, and suppress
or shift; the contradictions. in the system ot exploitation through
repression. Fully avare :6f ;th#. dangers of united African political
and;'%conomie mobilisation, tais group acted rutblessly to suppress
theai The fifties sav many IsgHlative attacks on these organisations.
Ccagretor leaders'vere restricted and trade union officials removed
from office.. Finally:oodtb April I960 the,AHC vas declared -an uu-
lawful :«rsBtfisatijontaAa foread- underground.? ,Unprepared for tbe
sudtotv'-siiiff-TrCnn a hlgnlyf visible legal.: movement to a clandestine
oraanisatiofl, i t sufferednmaoy defeats during tbe following decade
and now operates largely-M aw eidle movexent.'. - ; . .. •.
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